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Abstract
As it comes to animal ethics, broad versions of contractualism are often used as a reason for excluding
animals from the category of those with moral value in the individualistic sense. Ideas of “reciprocity”
and “moral agency” are invoked to show that only those capable of understanding and respecting the
value of others may have value themselves. Because of this, possible duties toward animals are often
made dependent upon altruism: to pay regard to animals is to act in an other-regarding manner instead of
mutual benefit. There are three main versions of altruism in animal ethics. The first one of these is the
most traditional, and emphasises benevolence as a source of moral regard. The second concentrates on
the notion of value, and claims that animals have value in the individualistic sense despite being
incapable of moral agency. The third resists overt theory-dependency, often included in the second
version, and concentrates more on the elements of “context” and “identification”. Out of these, a
combination of the last two is identified as the most fruitful basis for altruistic animal ethics.
Introduction
Although the notions of “reciprocity” and “moral agency” are not necessarily primary in ethics
concerning human beings, and although contractual ethics has only limited footing in moral thought,
when it comes to the moral value of animals, such notions are repeatedly invoked. Those who argue
against the moral value of animals in the individualistic sense1 are especially prone to argue that such
value depends upon the capacity to act reciprocally, and hence depends on moral agency as something
that actualises the capacity to comprehend and follow duties. In short: one can only have moral value in
the individualistic sense, if one can respect the moral value of others. Hence, for instance, Roger Scruton
writes that: “There are great benefits attached to the status of a moral being, and also great burdens.
Unless we are in a position to impose the burdens, the benefits make no sense”,2 thereby making moral
value in the individualistic sense intrinsically connected to understanding duties. This emphasis on
reciprocity and moral agency has led to a situation where animals have been largely excluded from the
scope of moral value in the individualistic sense. As mere moral “patients”3 rather than agents, they are
thought to be incapable of reciprocity,4 and are hence left outside “inherent value” and “rights”. Almost
identical remarks to those of Scruton have been the basis of most criticism of the notions of animal value
and/or rights.5 Now, the result of the claims that emphasis on reciprocity depends partly on self-benefit,
and that moral value in the individualistic sense is connected to moral agency, is that any moral regard
for animals is often thought to depend upon altruism. That is, since a certain amount of egoism is the
basis of the value of moral agents, a certain amount of altruism must be the basis of concern for moral
patients.
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/aaltola.html[9/18/2009 4:56:54 PM]
The common definition of “altruism” runs as follows: “The inclination to behave in such a way as to
benefit others, without the anticipation of reward from external sources; unselfishness”6 . Altruism, then,
implies acting for the sake of another being, regardless of self-benefit. As will be seen, many of those
arguing against the individualistic value of animals still insist that they ought to be given some moral
regard, usually based upon altruistic notions.7 Although altruism as such is a notoriously debated matter,
relatively little regard is given to the different manners in which altruism is used in animal ethics. The
motive of this paper is to analyse three different approaches to “altruistic animal ethics”, all of which are
both intertwined and contradictory in relation to each other (that is, they include certain similarities,
whilst being, in parts, incompatible). The notion of altruism used is very broad, concentrating on the
definition offered above – that is, any moral regard to animals that is not based upon reciprocity or other
expectation of self-benefit is understood to be “altruistic”. The first approach, most common amongst
those critical of the moral value of animals, argues that altruism is motivated by benevolence: we act
altruistically out of kindness or compassion. The second approach, which is most common in the
“classics” of animal ethics, claims that altruism simply means valuing others as ends in themselves: we
abandon our selfish motives when we recognise inherent value also in others. The third approach, which
is part of the “third generation” of animal ethics, finds the source of altruism in our capacity to identify
with others and feel empathy toward them; it also places much emphasis on “context”. According to this
interpretation we take others into account not only because we want to view ourselves as kind people or
because we feel a certain duty toward the inherent value of others, but because we genuinely feel for their
well being. Hence, the paper will concentrate on altruism as 1) as acting out of benevolence, 2) as seeing
inherent value in others, and 3) as identifying with others.
Approach 1: Benevolence
As mentioned, according to some traditional theories, animals do not fit into the second approach, for
they are not moral agents. That is, only moral agents may have value in the individualistic sense, and as
mere moral patients at best, animals cannot be included. This type of view is usually connected to ideas
of reciprocity, even when theories presenting it are not contractual. That is, the element of mutuality is
understood to be a crucial part of ethics, and only those capable of respecting the value of others are
thought to be capable of possessing value. Perhaps the most famous advocate of this view is Kant, who
claims that only autonomous, moral agents can be “ends in themselves”. Since animals do not fit this
category, they exist merely “as means to an end”, and are therefore valuable only in the instrumental
sense. More than this, Kant thought that all duties (including the duty to avoid inflicting unnecessary
pain) toward them are indirect.8 The basis for our duties toward animals is found from something external
to the animals themselves, and hence even kind treatment is an act that is not done for the sake of the
animals, but rather to serve some further purpose. This further purpose is to build the moral character of
agents and make them behave benevolently toward other humans: treating animals kindly is thought to
cultivate humanity and lead to kind treatment of human beings.9 We have duties toward animals, not
because of what they are, but because of what we as humans are (or want to be). Now, although the
Kantian understanding of animals has been influential, it obviously offers no basis for altruism, as the
regard for animals is not motivated by the animals themselves.
A version of the Kantian understanding10 has been rather popular and appears, for instance, in the
writings of Hume and Nietzsche. This version accepts the premise that animals do not have value in the
individualistic sense, whilst being critical of the premise that duties toward animals are indirect. Hume
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thought that animals cannot be part of the moral society or have rights, for the society consists of beings
of equal character, and animals are in many ways inferior to (although not categorically different from)
human beings. Still, he claimed it to be important that: “We should be bound by the laws of humanity to
give gentle usage to these creatures”.11 Nietzsche talked of the importance of pity towards animal
suffering, and claimed that “blind suffering” is the spring of the “deepest emotion”.12 Hence, although
animals differ from human beings in relation to moral value, their suffering is still something that ought
to be given moral regard – not to enhance “moral character”, but because of the animals themselves.
Regard toward animals is made dependent on “humanity” (and emotional attitudes that go with it) that is
other-directed rather than self-directed. Therefore, it is based on altruism: animals are to be treated
kindly simply because of unselfish regard for their well-being.
Today, the view has yet again altered, as altruism in the form of benevolence is mixed with a claim that
animals have value also in themselves, even if such value is not identical with that of human beings. The
contemporary understanding often claims to differ from Kant in maintaining both that there are direct
duties toward animals, and that animals have some type of value in themselves – that is, animals are seen
to have more than instrumental value, although this value is different from that of human beings and
cannot be defined as “individualistic”. Here, altruism toward animals is made dependent on both value,
and other-directed “humane” emotions. For instance, Carl Cohen argues that we have direct duties
toward animals, which are built upon “kindness”. Furthermore, although he emphasises in the Kantian
manner that since animals are not moral, autonomous agents they cannot have rights or value in the
individualistic sense, he does think that animals have some type of value other than purely instrumental.13
This type of reasoning is also found in theories of moral contract, such as Rawls’s theory of justice.14
Animals are not part of the moral contract15 , and they do not qualify as ends in themselves. Still, their
moral value is not entirely denied, and their suffering is seen as a source for both value, and direct duties
toward them. Whereas Cohen speaks of “kindness”, Rawls speaks of “compassion and humanity” when it
comes to animal suffering. The view is common in contemporary culture at large, as the so-called
“welfarist” attitude toward animals claims that animals do have some type of value in themselves, and
argues that animals should be treated with kindness.
However, despite the facts that altruism is emphasised as the source of direct duties, and that animals are
even seen to have some moral value in themselves, this approach is not entirely dissimilar to that offered
by Kant. First of all, it has to be noted that that the value given to animals tends to be rather minimal.
Often (as with Cohen), the value is based on matters such as “life” or “uniqueness”: animals are of value
as living, unique entities. The other common option (exemplified by Rawls) is to emphasise capacity to
feel pain as the source of value. Although this definition is different from the one emphasising
instrumentality, it still is a far leap from value in the individualistic sense. It underlines value in the
“limited sense” as value is restricted to a certain element of an animal (life or pain), and leads only to
duties that concern that element (“respect life”, “do not cause pain”). In the case of life or uniqueness,
animals are ultimately in the same category with plants, and hence there is no great difference between
duties toward dogs and duties toward trees.16 That is, if it is merely life that is emphasised in relation to
animals, there is little to morally separate them from things such as plants. In the case of capacity to feel
pain, animals are given more regard than plants, but still much less than “individuals”: it is only matters
directly related to pain that are of importance (hence, animals may for instance be used instrumentally as
long as causing pain to them is avoided – a common belief states it to be acceptable for instance to kill
or captivate animals, as long as rearing them is done kindly)17 . The limited nature of the value of
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animals in this context is exemplified in the manner in which it is common-place to argue (as, for
instance, Cohen does) that even though there are duties toward animals, animals cannot have rights18 if
“absurd consequences”19 , such as giving rights to carrots or saving the rabbit from the fox, are to be
avoided. That is, their value is not enough to lead to actual claims toward human beings.
The limited status of their value is underlined by the manner in which human “kindness” is often seen as
elementary for us having moral regard for them: as stated above, their value as such is insufficient. That
is, duties toward animals are often only secondarily based on their value, and primarily based on human
benevolence. The dependency on human nature has clear consequences. Firstly, duties are considered
rather voluntary, as they depend on the subjective willingness to act benevolently (indeed, quite
commonly regard for animals is seen as a “personal” matter). Often, they are understood in a similar
sense as “charity”, kindness to animals is what nice people do as an extra-pursuit, and notions such as
“pity” are used to underline why we ought to refrain from, say, causing unnecessary harm to animals.
That is, kindness toward animals is a virtue that is not enforced: it is a positive element in one’s
behaviour, but instead of being a strict obligation, it rests on personal choice. Hence, regard for animals
is ultimately supererogatory (this voluntary basis for the duties is concretely exemplified by the manner
in which animal welfare laws usually include only minimal punishments, and lead rarely to
prosecution)20 . The second consequence is that duties toward animals are heavily dependent upon
conditions – even if it is claimed that duties do exist outside personal charity, the duties are based on the
context rather than the animal herself. More specifically, the duties apply only when duties toward human
beings do not overstep them. Since the value of animals is limited in comparison to that of human
beings, the latter are prioritised at the expense of the former. This has lead to a situation where almost
“everything goes” as long as it is not obviously sadistic – that is, any human interests ranging from
aesthetic to economic are seen as justifying the use of animals (prime examples being factory farming,
fur farming and fox hunting). It is because of this that the term “unnecessary” suffering is not considered
problematic, and that “necessary” suffering is thought to be not only something that should be tolerated,
but something that should be actively inflicted upon animals, a prime example being some types of
animal experimentation. Thus, duties toward animals remain restricted at best, and secondary at worst.
It is possible to claim that there is nothing wrong as such with an approach that links moral regard
toward animals to voluntary charity and contingent factors – surely this is altruism in one of its typical
forms. However, it also has to be noticed that because benevolence plays such a crucial role in duties
toward animals, it is unclear whether it is the animals themselves that are the source of motivation, and
whether we may talk of altruism at all. In the end, the Kantian notion of enhancing one’s humanity may
be found as the ground for duties toward animals, as benevolence may not be only the cause for regard,
but actually the primary goal of it. That is, for instance kindness may be seen as a “proper” part of
humanity; it is the “decent” thing to do, a duty that belongs to the life of those that consider themselves
“humane”. Therefore, it may not be the animals themselves, but our own moral character that is at
stake.21
The criticism suggests, then, that not only is the value of animals according to this approach very
limited, but also that the duties are voluntary, contingent and even indirect. However, the main point of
criticism is that it is not clear at all that animals do not have moral value in the individualistic sense. An
adequate theory of animal ethics requires accepting that animals do have individualistic value, which
makes not only their pain, but interests in general, of moral importance. Hence, it can be maintained that
regard for animals is not a matter of restricted duties – rather, it is a matter of duties toward individuals.
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More than this, acknowledging the value of animals would make duties toward them independent of our
willingness to act kindly, contingent factors, or the need to cultivate humanity.
Approach 2: Value in the individualistic sense
Especially in the last three decades animal ethics has presented powerful arguments for accepting that
animals do have value in themselves, as individuals.22 It has sought to prove that standard ethical
traditions, from utilitarianism to rights theory, will, if consistently read, include animals in the category
of valuable individuals. Hence, the claim that regard for them is voluntary benevolence or “charity” is
criticised, as animals are given qualitatively similar value compared to that of human beings. What is of
importance here is that animal ethics emphasises that beings do not need to enter reciprocal agreements
in order to have value in the individualistic sense – nor do they have to be moral agents. Even when
contractual ethics is used as a basis for the moral value of animals23 , this is done by emphasising that
reciprocity and moral agency are not necessary criteria for value in the individualistic sense. The basic
idea, offered for instance by Tom Regan, is that individuals are to be valued as themselves, without
paying regard to the fact of whether they can or cannot respect the value of others.24 That is, moral value
is separated from moral activity – an individual’s actions towards others are not relevant from the point
of view of her value (hence the separation into “moral agents” and “moral patients”). Because of this, it
is value itself that can give the basis for direct duties and altruism: animals are valued as themselves and
given moral regard despite the fact that doing so is not based on reciprocity and mutual benefit. Thus,
whereas the former approach bases altruism on the fact that regard for animals lies outside the scope of
individual ethics, the second approach argues that it stems exactly from the fact that animals are inside
such a scope. The crucial difference here is between the meta-ethical beliefs: the first one sees individual
ethics as based upon contractual self-interest, whereas the latter views ethics without notions of
reciprocity.
The reason for criticising agency as a criterion is partly founded upon the so-called “argument from
marginal cases”, as many claim that the moral agency criterion would exclude not only animals, but also
many humans.25 More than this, the claim is that the notion of moral agency simply does not cover what
we comprehend intuitively as valuable in other beings; we do not, for example, feel the suffering and
killing of others to be something that should be avoided because those in question have the capacity to
comprehend morality – rather, the reason stems from a broader conception of what type of beings those
in question are.26 Of course, also the notion of reciprocity has been under review as contractual ethics has
been claimed (for instance by Mary Midgley) to both rest on an overly simplistic conception of human
nature as inherently selfish, and to lead to an ethics that favours the capable at the expense of those less
capable.27 A fourth reason is more theoretical, as the claim is that contemporary moral theories, when
consistently read, simply lead to making moral agency (at best) only a sufficient criterion for moral value
in the individualistic sense. The argument is that sentience, or phenomenal consciousness in the Nagelian
sense, is the necessary and “neutral” basis for moral value. To put it bluntly, the common argument
(offered with some variation for instance by Peter Singer and Evelyn Pluhar) is that well-being is a basic
value to us, and that it is because of this that consciousness in the phenomenal sense is of importance as
it makes the experience of well-being possible. Since cognitive ethology suggests that many animals
indeed are conscious beings, they also have moral value in the individualistic sense.28 The view seems
well justified, for none of the traditional ways of excluding animals from the moral sphere are consistent.
Neither the categorical argument (which claims that humans differ categorically from the rest of the
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/aaltola.html[9/18/2009 4:56:54 PM]
animal kingdom); nor the humanistic argument (which claims species to be the criterion for moral value);
nor the argument from social inclinations (which claims that humans “naturally” favour other humans)
succeed in showing that animals do not have value in themselves, as individuals.29
Part of the animal ethics argument is that there are direct duties based upon the value of animals. These
duties do not share the characteristics of those involved in the reciprocal understanding of animals, as
they are neither indirect, limited, conditional, nor voluntary. Just as the value of animals is qualitatively
similar to that of human beings, so are the duties similar. Hence, duties toward them are not based on the
need of moral agents to cultivate their moral nature, but on the value of the animals – I refrain from
kicking a dog, not because I wish to strengthen my humanity, but because of the dog itself. Perhaps most
famously Tom Regan has criticised what he calls the “cruelty-kindness view”, which ultimately
underlines a type of indirect benevolence, and which is exemplified in Cohen’s notion of kindness.
According to him, it is only secondary whether we are acting because of noble or good intentions, for the
primary factor is the animal herself.30 Also, the duties are not limited to matters such as the pain of the
animal as it is not only the suffering of animals that matters, but the animal as a whole, with all its
interests – hence, I ought not only avoid causing pain, but also take other interests of the animal into
account.31 Similarly, the violation of their value cannot be justified on the condition that to do so would
bring benefits to human beings – suffering does not become “necessary” and hence justifiable on the
basis of human benefit.32 Furthermore, to refrain from kicking the dog is not a voluntary matter done in
the name of charity and resembling a supererogatory act, but a compelling duty, giving a basis also for
the rights of animals. The argument then goes: 1) animals have value in the individualistic sense, and 2)
duties toward them are not only direct, but also un-limited, unconditional and compelling. The concrete
nature of the duties is directly deduced from the type of value the animal is thought to have, and (as
Regan famously claims) stipulates generally that animals are to be treated with respect (“The Respect
Principle”) and without causing harm (“The Harm Principle”)33 .
Therefore, it can be argued that moral regard for animals is not altruism in the sense of benevolence, but
altruism in the second sense, which claims animals to be “ends in themselves”. However, this approach
also faces difficulties. The main source of criticism is found from the difference between “first
generation” animal ethics on one hand, and “second” and “third generation” on the other. The first
generation concentrates on applying standard ethical theories (such as virtue ethics34 or utilitarianism) to
animals, hence accepting theory-dependency – the prime examples are Peter Singer and Tom Regan. The
second generation, however, seeks to build a more heterogenic ethics, in which viewpoints from different
theories are taken into account, and in which dependency on one existing theory is resisted – an example
is S.F. Sapontzis. The third generation goes even further, and is built upon criticism of theory in
general.35 The criticism has concentrated on the manner in which the first generation follows quite strictly
the path of traditional ethics, which is understood to be problematic on many levels, including
universalism, objectivism, abstraction and monism. It is argued that animal ethics has assumed there to
be objectively discoverable, universally applicable truths, which are restricted in number and independent
of the “practical level”. Hence, it has assumed that there is some one objective criterion for individual
value, which leads to duties that apply to all contexts, and does not involve practical considerations. A
handful of general duties (such as those deducible from the “Respect Principle”) are thought to be able to
guide our actions, and the nature of these duties is understood to be independent from the practical
context and its particularities. Now, since it has been famously argued that humans are not beings
capable of finding “objective” truths; that without objectivism universal claims can be problematic; that a
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/aaltola.html[9/18/2009 4:56:54 PM]
few principles cannot take into account the infinite number of practical situations; and that such situations
need to be taken into account when making moral decisions for morality to have any relevance at all, the
foundations of the first generation animal ethics seem shaky at first sight.36
These criticisms seem justified up to a point, as proponents of the first generation animal ethics have
tended to overly emphasise theory. The main problem is, firstly, that given theories are often offered as
“closed systems”: for instance, rights theory with its implications can be taken to be the only “correct”
manner of valuing animals, and valuable elements from other theories (such as utilitarianism) are left
aside (and vice versa). Secondly, a rather abstract and broad nature of duties is implied: broad duties are
offered as a basis for animal ethics without practical examples concerning exactly how such duties are to
be followed. (For example “the respect principle”, which requires us to take the welfare of animals into
account, does not tell what to do in complex conflicts of interest.) However, before going further, it has
to be noted that despite the structural limitations of first generation animal ethics, much of the content
remains strong. That is, although the idea of abstract, monistic duties is problematic, the argument that
animals indeed do have moral value in the individualistic sense can be well defended.
Approach 3: Identification
Recent years have seen a growing emphasis on the practical aspect of ethics. The criticism of the above-
mentioned elements of traditional ethics has rested largely on the idea that theory has maintained a
predominant position in ethical thought, and that practice ought to be given more footing. Theory is seen
as resting on a Cartesian framework, which underlines all the mentioned elements, and assumes there to
be a neutral “subject” that is distinct from the “objects” it analyses. In this framework, ethics is argued to
have become a type of “calculus”, wherein moral agents neutrally apply different conditions (“numbers”)
to a set principle (“formula”).37 What is needed, the argument goes, is more attention to the practical side
of ethical dilemmas, both in the sense of paying more thorough regard 1) to the nature of ethical
epistemology, and 2) to the nature of practical situations encountered in decision making. With regard to
the first of these, it is claimed that humans are not neutral beings separated from the objects of their
knowledge. Regarding the latter, it is argued that practical situations are so complex that no monistic,
abstract and universal “formula” could ever answer for all of them. Hence, both the practical side of
human epistemology38 and the context of ethical dilemmas are to be taken into account.
When it comes to human epistemology, the main claim is that humans are context-situated beings, who
are bound by the tendencies of basic human nature. That is, we do not see things from a neutral
perspective, and are affected not only by our specific viewpoints, but also by basic human attributes,
such as biological and emotional matters. For example, Val Plumwood has argued for an ethics that
would take into account the fact that humans are locally situated beings, who see matters from a certain
perspective, and who for instance feel attachment to those close to them.39 As the example’s emphasis on
attachment shows, part of resisting the image of moral agents as objective, impartial beings is paying
attention to the overwhelming regard often given to rationality. The argument is that it is precisely the
project of rationality that has lead to underlining matters such as objectivity and monism, and that in
order to give more room for the practical aspects of human nature, the meaning of emotion needs to be
recognised40 . Thus, there is a demand for recognising emotion as one of the bases for ethics (rather than
viewing ethics as a rational calculus made by wholly neutral beings).
When it comes to the issue of context, on the other hand, the argument is that we should try to approach
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each situation through its particularities and take into account the fact that no two situations can be
categorised (or “codified”) as the same. Particularists (such as Martha Nussbaum and Bernard
Williams)41 argue that to have a real moral comprehension of the world we have to start with the
particular situations and contexts, working our way up from practice into theory instead of the other way
around. Part of the concentration on the particular situations is taking into account the viewpoints of the
beings involved. Martha Nussbaum, for instance, uses the term “perception” (in a rather postmodern
manner) to underline the fact that we ought to be open to concrete situations and to the perspectives of
those who the situations touch. We are not to see beings as abstract entities, but as individuals with their
own histories and viewpoints.
In animal ethics, epistemological and contextual elements have been analysed especially from the point of
view of “identification”. The argument broadly stated is that it is the capacity to recognise the other
being’s point of view that leads not only to understanding her as a morally valuable being in the
individualistic sense (having a point of view to identify with is the necessary criterion for such value),
but also to managing ethical dilemmas in a more fruitful manner. On the epistemological side,
identification is connected to the emphasis on emotions. To put it simplistically: we value because we
care, and we care because we can identify42 . Also, biology is underlined. The argument is that
identification is a part of human nature in the biological sense43 , and that the roots of identification can
be tracked down to evolution. On the contextual side, the type of perception that Nussbaum underlines is
obviously connected to identification: therefore, it is not only moral value that is to be determined
through identification, but also contextual ethical dilemmas.
For instance, the afore-mentioned Mary Midgley argues for the importance of emotion, and emphasises
that moral value in the individualistic sense is attached to identification. She claims that: “What makes
creatures our fellow beings, entitled to basic consideration, is surely not intellectual capacity but
emotional fellowship,”44 and goes on to argue that this emotional fellowship is based on consciousness:
“The special importance of sentience or consciousness in a being outside ourselves is that it can give that
being experiences sufficiently like our own to bring into play the Golden Rule”… “To recognize the
spark of conscious life out there is to see it as having a certain importance”45 . Consciousness, then,
gives grounds for identification, and it is because of this that dogs and cows differ morally from cars and
flower-pots, for quite literally, we may only try to know what it is like to be another being, if it is like
something to be that being. Also, an “emotocentric” approach to interests, advocated for instance by
Warren Neill, favours identification to some extent as a ground for animal ethics, as the experience and
capacity to understand other beings’ experiences are made central. The importance of biology is
underlined by Midgley and James Rachels, who have argued for the significance of identification from
the biological, evolutionary point of view. The argument is that capacity to identify is crucial for the
birth and content of morality: recognition of similarities makes not only our own, but also the interests of
others significant.46 Midgley also underlines contextuality, and claims that we should approach ethical
dilemmas through the point of view of the situation (which she calls a “reflective model”), rather than by
trying to enforce the same principles on all situations. Bryan Norton has also argued for a contextual
approach to animal ethics, although he does not underline identification.47 Before going further, it has to
be noted that “identification ethics” is an umbrella term, which includes many different approaches,
ranging from emphasis on different aspects of epistemology to emphasis on the context. Therefore, some
understandings may be quite biological, whilst others may be, for example, quite contextual.48
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The altruistic tendencies behind identification ethics are not hard to find: animals are given moral regard
because of their own point of view. However, this approach to altruism clearly differs from the first one.
As seen, acting kindly or benevolently because of pity is often directed at one’s self: we want to feel we
are good people. Identification and empathy, on the other hand, are clearly other-directed: it is the
perspective of the other that motivates kind acts. Here the definition of “empathy” (a term often used as
correlative with “identification”) becomes important. As Peter Goldie points out, empathy is simulative
by nature, and “involves imagining the experience of a narrative” from another being’s point of view – it
is “feeling into”.49 That is, we try to simulate the condition of another being by creating a narrative that
would suit that condition. This creation is heavily other-directed, for we try to imagine what it is like for
her, rather than what it would be like for us, if we were her. The identification approach to altruism also
differs from the second one described above, since the practical level is given more importance. That is,
it is not only theory that leads to altruism, but also practicality: we give moral regard not only because
we “know”, but because we “see” and “feel”.
However, there are some problems with this third approach (only a few of which can be dealt with here).
First of all, let’s look at particularism. Pluralism is often a part of particularism, as the suggestion
(offered in animal ethics for instance by Mary Ann Warren) is that there ought to be no “True” moral
principle or value, but rather many, from which we are to choose on the basis of the context50 . Now,
paying attention to practice and pluralism of options is a welcome idea, for surely one theory with a
handful of principles cannot do justice to each specific situation and context. To try to do so is
understood to be “codifying”, reducing the plurality of life by generalisation into simple categories. Still,
it remains unclear whether monism can be wholly abandoned, and whether generalisations are necessarily
the evil they are made out to be.
First of all, the by now famous problem of pluralism shows that in order to resist relativism, pluralism
requires some type of “meta-criterion” (and hence ultimately meta-theory) as a basis on which to decide
between different options.51 That is, to simply “choose” without consistent criteria becomes an arbitrary
matter, and easily turns into subjective opinion rather than societal ethics (for instance, highly subjective
notions of ”intuition” and ”taste” have been suggested as the basis for pluralistic decision-making)52 .
Secondly, although overt generalisations cease to notice the particularities of each context, generalisations
still are a necessary part of thought, as categorisation is included in the act of making sense of the world -
we simply have to categorise to some extent or we live in the world of chaos.53 Hence, rather than resist
generalisations as such as “codifying”, it is more fruitful to concentrate on what type of generalisations
are justified – “generalisations” and ”meta-principles” should not be avoided at the expense of deserting
all criteria.54 Full contextualism and pluralism are not, then, viable options.
The problem of particularism is relevant to identification ethics, for we are without an answer as to what
to do after identification: if I can identify and see the situation of both a dog and a human being, how am
I to make decisions in favor of either? It may be claimed that what becomes crucial at this point is
looking at not only the personal narratives of those involved, but also other practical aspects of the
context: why are specifically x and y involved in the situation, what would the consequences of given
decisions be, etc. The claim may be that the more knowledge one has of the situation, the more (rather
than less) clearly the moral picture starts to emerge. Still, even with such knowledge we do not get very
far, if there is no clear way of assessing such knowledge. To give a simple example, it may be argued
that we ought to pay more attention to the viewpoint of a victim rather than the rapist, simply because of
having knowledge of his possible callous attitudes and details of his act. Still, there is no reason to make
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such assertion if there is no moral theory as to why callous attitudes and rapes are morally problematic,
and mere identification offers no such reasons. The main problem is that identification tends to remain
quite a formal approach with little content as to what to do with the identification, and if we are left to
decide upon the context, relativism is an inevitable danger.
Also, the emphasis on biology faces difficulties. It does seem justified to claim that altruism in the form
of identification has played an essential part in our evolution.55 We are more than collections of selfish
genes, and it may well be that the capacity to identify and feel for others is at the heart of humanity.56
However, how relevant this factor is remains unclear. A version57 of the genetic fallacy claims that we
cannot infer the content from the origin without further premises. This means that the origin of morality
cannot be equated with the content of it, and that therefore even if empathy is the origin of our moral
behaviour, it cannot determine the content of morality as it exists now. Also (and more famously) the
naturalistic fallacy claims that norms cannot be concluded from facts without further premises. Because
of this it can be claimed that even if we do to a large extent follow empathetic feelings when deciding
our actions, this is not necessarily the way we ought to be making our decisions.58 Still, these problems
are not as severe as they look. Midgley for one has pointed out that, first of all, the genetic fallacy does
not mean that the origin does not matter at all, for to understand the origin of morality helps us to better
see its function, importance and possibilities.59 This looks like a justified argument. We cannot deduce
the content from the origin, but surely the origin has an effect on the content. (Midgley uses the example
of a strange orphan: in order to better understand her, we need to gather some information about her
origin.) Midgley also claims that the naturalistic fallacy fares no better. She thinks that we are being
naturalistic if we reduce everything to biology. However, taking biology into account is not naturalism.
On the contrary, recognising the importance of biology and our human tendencies is an important part of
understanding what we are, what we ought to be and what we ought to do – without it both the
conception concerning ourselves and ethics remain only partial.60
It seems, then, that the fallacies do not necessarily threaten identification ethics. As is rather common-
place to argue these days, the ”is” is involved with the ”ought” – in fact, the latter makes no sense
without the former. When it comes to ethics, it seems bizarre and overtly abstract to find a basis for it
whilst completely overlooking the biological nature of human beings. Still, one has to be careful with
how much emphasis is given to biology. This is because, first of all, the ”is” is always partly a
construction, the meaning of which is contested and altered constantly. In a situation where there is no
absolutely neutral manner of perceiving the ”is”, to make it the basis of ethics is always a potentially
dangerous and circular enterprise, for it is often value-ladden presumptions that guide the construction /
interpretation of the ”is” (an unfortunately famous example being racism). Secondly, to follow the ”is”
without theoretical restrictions (which themselves again will to some extent overstep the importance of
the ”is”) leads to a situation where ethics could be anything. That is, if (to give a simplistic example) it
were somehow proven that the selfish-gene theory does apply and that human beings are basically
egoistic beings with little biological regard for others, the resulting ethics would have to be accepted if no
theoretical restrictions applied. Hence, to give room for biology is always a project that needs to be
approached with care. Ultimately, as with particularism, a meta-theory is needed in order to avoid pitfalls
of biology: we need something with which to discriminate the morally relevant aspects in biology from
those without moral relevance.
A further difficulty is encountered in relation to the structure of ”emotion”. If identification is understood
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as an emotion, does it not threaten to become a personal matter, which may equally well result in
negative viewpoints, as it does in positive viewpoints? That is, do we not identify on the basis of
personal sentiment, giving priority to those near us or those like us, and disregarding those that we find
somehow alien or repugnant? Obviously, this is an important aspect in animal ethics, as it is precisely
incapacity (or, as Brian Luke claims, reluctance) to feel empathy toward many animals that has lead to
their demise. That is, people have difficulties in having positive identification with, say, rats and pigs,
and this in itself has often lead to their exclusion from the moral zone.61 In order to answer this
difficulty, it is important to note that despite the demand for emotions, “identification” is not to be
understood in the rather common conception of emotion, which correlates emotions with “emotional
episodes”62 . Whereas the latter defines emotions as sporadic “sentiments”, identification is a considered
attitude, which includes both the elements of longevity (it is not impulsive) and reasonableness (it is
based upon a clear belief-structure). Hence, identification is not an arbitrary matter, founded on the basis
of personal preference but rather something intertwined with beliefs. As has been emphasised for
instance by Martha Nussbaum, emotions are not empty of beliefs, but rather include them63 . We
entertain emotions because of given beliefs, and explain emotions through beliefs.64 Here, theory comes
to be of importance, as the beliefs involved in identification need to be explained and justified.
Therefore, emotion may be elementary for comprehending values, but theory is still required in order to
specify those values. We may feel immediate empathy with other beings, but the relevance of such
empathy should be based also on beliefs concerning with whom and why we ought to empathize.65
Giving theory importance has two consequences. Firstly, it is not any identification that has moral
meaning, but only identification that is built upon a criterion that can be justified as ethically relevant.66
Secondly, in case of lack of identification, theory may motivate us to identify with other beings, as we
may simply be reminded that we ought to take also their point of view into account. Therefore, there
should be no difference between friends and strangers or cats and people in the light of identification that
is based upon ethical premises.
Peter Goldie presents an additional critique of empathy: he argues that empathy does not necessarily lead
to any type of care. We do not necessarily feel care even if we see the viewpoint of another and because
of this, he claims that: “Empathy is not the high road to an ethical outlook”.67 However, his assertion is
unconvincing, for he overlooks the distinction between observation and understanding.68 It is true that
taking into account the viewpoint of another may only give us an observation of what it is like to be
another being, and as such result in neutrality. Still, the aspect of understanding is missing if we do not
have an adequate emotional response toward that other being and without such understanding, we cannot
meaningfully talk of empathy. For empathy to truly exist, we have to understand, not merely observe,
and part of understanding is emotional engagement with what it would be like to be another being. We
cannot have grasped the point of view of another thoroughly, if her viewpoint is not escorted by
emotions. For instance, I am lacking in my conception of someone’s suffering, if I do not have an
emotional response toward that suffering. Therefore, it can be argued that empathy does conceptually
include the element of care.
What all these points of criticism reveal is that the element that is needed is a theory concerning what is
being valued, and why. Although the meaning of theory needs to be contested to some extent, and the
role of the practical level emphasized, theory with all its “codification” is not to be thoroughly
abandoned. That is, for the third approach to succeed, it needs to be combined to some extent with the
second approach: identification needs to meet theory in a thorough manner. This applies to both
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conception of value and practical decision-making. First of all, there needs to be a theory of value that is
based upon something more than biological or emotive tendencies (even if these tendencies have much to
do with that value) simply in order to avoid giving the biological or emotional “is” too much importance.
Secondly, the contextual aspects of making actual decisions need to be grounded on theory instead of
simply appplying various principles (and even theories). When contextual aspects are emphasized, there
needs to be something solid with which those aspects are evaluated order to avoid relativity.69
How should the second and third approach to altruism be combined? What is suggested is that
identification and contextual considerations should be taken into account primarily in a structural sense.
That is, moral value and ethical dilemmas should be approached through acknowledging the viewpoint of
those involved and paying attention to the particularities of each situation. In animal ethics this means
that animals should be seen as individuals and their viewpoints taken into account when considering, for
instance, what types of human – animal relations are morally justifiable. Still, identification and
contextuality are not enough, and need to be accompanied by theoretical frameworks that provide content
to principles (such as the prima facie principle against killing animals for human consumption) and give
reasons to prioritize certain contextual elements over others (such as interests of animals over economic
profit). Here the second approach to altruism is of importance. Although the theories it has offered have
tended to be quite abstract and not detailed enough to account for practical situations, the theoretical
viewpoint to animal ethics itself is to be given room. What should be worked toward is an animal ethics
that includes a strong meta-basis for the moral value of animals, detailed principles concerning human-
animal relations that also take identification into account, and contextual deliberation. Of course, this
might be easier said than done, as the disputes between “generalists” and “particularists” show. Still, it
may be the only option since both general principles and emphasis on practice are needed. This is
especially evident in animal ethics, where the gap between theories and practice can be quite extreme.
Conclusion
The first approach emphasising benevolence seems the poorest, and does not offer a justified basis for
animal ethics. The second approach to altruism, underlining value in the individualistic sense, seems
much more plausible, and has been successfully defended against criticism. However, its theory-
dependency might prove to be too strong, as abstraction is often prioritised at the expense of practicality.
Because of this, the third alternative that rests on identification does seem tempting. However, it also
faces some problems, especially that of not having a meta-theory. We seem to be in a dead-end: neither
abstract theories nor prioritising practice seem to do the trick. The suggestion is that it might be best to
give more room to theory and general principles after all, even at the risk of being charged with
“codifying” or “generalism”. We do need some theoretical guidelines concerning the moral treatment of
animals, especially as sentient creatures deserve more than relativism in their treatment. However, this
does not mean that overt theory-dependency should be adopted or that contextual considerations ought to
be ignored. Rather, what is suggested is that the third approach be combined with the second.
Elisa Aaltola
University of Turku
Notes
1. Rather than, for instance, “instrumental” (as the famous Kantian means to an end). Here the term
“individualistic” is favoured instead of the more traditional “inherent”, as the latter may be extended to
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entities lacking individualistic qualities, such as species. Value in the individualistic sense is here defined
as value, which 1) is based on a certain intrinsic characteristic(s) of the animal, 2) refers direct
obligations toward the animal itself, and 3) refers to obligations, the consequences of which are
experienced by the animal itself.
2. Scruton, Roger. Animal Rights and Wrongs. (London: Demos, 1996.) p. 32.
3. Term underlined by Regan, Tom. The Case for Animal Rights. (Berkeley: University of California
Press 1983).
4. A matter, which has been contested by some ethologists, as it seems that especially some social
animals require a notion of mutual duties. See Waal, Frans de, (ed.). Tree of Origin: What Primate
Behaviour Can Tell Us About Human Social Evolution. (Harvard University Press, 2002.)
5. See for instance Carruthers, Peter. The Animals Issue. Moral theory in Practice. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992.); Cohen, Carl. “Do Animals Have Rights?” Ethics & Behavior. Vol.
7:2 (1997).
6. Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. (London: Academic Press, 1998).
7. Next to this “meta-argument for altruism” in animal ethics, there is also a “practical argument for
altruism”. The latter has to do with concrete benefits gained from defining the value of animals in a given
manner. One of the reasons why many are reluctant to view animals as beings of moral value in the
individualistic sense is that this would lead to clear restrictions on the concrete benefits gained from
animals. We could no longer use them when it was not necessary, and this would result in viewing, for
instance, meat eating, fur farming and hunting for sport as morally doubtful practices. Because of this,
many believe that regard for animals depends on some form of altruism. Such a move is often considered
rather harmless in regard to consumption practices, as altruistic regard is secondary to moral value and/or
rights based on reciprocity.
8. See for instance Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement. Werner Pluhar (transl.). (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing, 1987); Kant, Immanuel. Brendan Liddell (ed.), Kant on the Foundation of Morality:
A Modern Version of the Grundlegung. (London: Indiana University Press, 1970), pp. 152-157. A similar
idea had been presented much earlier by St Thomas Aquinas.
9. See also the thoughts of Francis Hutcheson, in Bradie, Michael. “The Moral Status of Animals in
Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy”, in Jane Maienschein and Michael Ruse (eds.), Biology and the
Foundation of Ethics. (Cambridge: CUP 1999.)
10. Of course, it should be noted that those following the Kantian notion of animals are not necessarily
otherwise followers of Kantian philosophy.
11. Hume, David. “No Justice without Equality”, in Paul Clarke & Andrew Linzey, Political Theory and
Animal Rights. (London: Pluto Press, 1990), p. 122. Hume, David. “Treatise of Human Nature”. Thomas
Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose (eds.): The Philosophical Works of David Hume. (Scientia Verlag
Aalen, 1964.)
12. Nietzsche, Friedrich. ”Pity for Animals”. In Clarke & Linzey, p. 148. Again, we need to be careful
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(as Nietzsche remind us) not to automatically assume that pity is an other-directed feeling, rather than
self-motivated state.
13. Cohen, Carl, “In Defence of the Use of Animals”, in Carl Cohen & Tom Regan (eds.), The Animal
Rights Debate. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2001), p. 29, 46.
14. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 504-512. Rawls’s theory has
been criticised, amongst others, from the animal welfare point of view. For instance, Mark Rowland
claims that consistent interpretation of the theory requires including also animals in the moral agreement.
Rowland, Mark. Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence. (London: MacMillan, 1998.); see also
VanDeVeer, Donald. “Of Beasts, Persons and the Original Position”. The Monist 62:3 (1979).
15. Of course, it can be claimed that Rawls’s theory concerns justice, not morality. Still, the
differentiation between the two strikes one as odd. See an example found in Pritchard, Michael &
Robison, Wade. “Justice and the Treatment of Animals: A Critique of Rawls”. Environmental Ethics 3:1
(1981).
16. Actually, sometimes duties toward plants are seen as more significant, as implied for instance by
Holmes Rolston. See Hettinger, Ned. ”Valuing Predation in Rolston’s Environmental Ethics: Bambi
Lovers versus Tree Huggers”. Environmental Ethics 16:1 (1994).
17. This is a view that is even incorporated into Peter Singer’s ethics of animal liberation.
18. This is a matter that has been debated, for instance, between Regan and Cohen, and which presents
problems from the point of view of the ”correlation theory” between rights and duties. See Cohen &
Regan 2001.
19. The argument from “absurd consequences” is also advocated for instance by Mary Ann Warren.
20. Matters raised in the US by Gary Francione and Steven Wise, amongst others. See for instance,
Francione, Gary. Animals, Property, and the Law. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).
21. Of course, it has been suggested (for instance, by Derrida) that all moral behaviour is selfish, as its
goal is to clear our conscience. However, as has been claimed, it is important to separate between the
primary and secondary motivation of an action: although selfishness may play a part in moral behaviour,
such behaviour can only be called selfish if selfishness is the primary motivation.
22. See for example the writings of Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Bernard Rollin, David DeGrazia, Evelyn
Pluhar, James Rachels, Stephen Clark, S.F. Sapontzis and Mark Rowlands.
23. For instance, as seen above, Mark Rowlands uses Rawls’s theory of justice in his ethics. Rowlands
1998.
24. Regan 1983.
25. For a thorough analysis, see Dombrowski, Daniel. Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal
Cases. (University of Illinois Press, 1997.). It is often claimed that potential or lost agency gives value in
the individualistic sense also to the "marginal cases." However, this argument fails for two often repeated
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reasons: first, it is unclear why a past or future capacity is relevant to how we ought to be treated
(although we once were children or we all will be ill at some point, we should not be treated as such).
Secondly, this does not cover all of the marginal cases, for some never were and never will be moral
agents.
26. See for instance Anderson, James C. “Species Equality and the Foundations of Moral Theory”.
Environmental Values 2 (1993); Clark, Stephen R.L. Animals and Their Moral Standing. London:
Routledge, 1997), pp. 76-77.
27. See Midgley, Mary. The Ethical Primate. Humans, freedom and morality. (London: Routledge,
1994); Sapontzis, S. F. Morals, Reason, and Animals. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
28. The famous text can be found from: Nagel, Thomas. “What is it like to be a Bat?”, The Philosophical
Review LXXXIII, 4 (October 1974): 435-50. In animal ethics this definition has been endorsed at length
for instance in DeGrazia, David, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status. (Cambridge:
CUP, 1996). On cognitive ethology, see Dawkins, Marian Stamp. Through Our Eyes Only? The Search
for Animal Consiousness. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Bekoff, Marc. Minding Animals:
Awareness, Emotions, and Heart. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Rogers, Lesley J. Minds of
Their Own. Thinking and Awareness in Animals. (Westview Press, 1997).
29. To put it briefly (and superficially) indeed, the categorical argument simply fails to find a
characteristic that all and only humans have. It usually ends up emphasising the meaning of moral
agency, but in doing so is open to the criticism of the “marginal argument”. It also remains unclear why
moral agency should be the sole criterion for moral value: surely I value other human beings for (also)
other reasons than their moral autonomy? The humanistic argument has been set as an answer to the
marginal argument, and it claims that also those human beings who are not moral agents count morally
because they are human. This is the weakest of the arguments, for it does not offer any further premises
for the claim: the moral meaning of species remains without explanation (this is most likely because such
an explanation would fall back into the categorical argument). Also the notion of species as a “type,” that
somehow collectively "owns" the capacity for moral agency, presents problems. The third option has
been the argument from natural inclinations, but also it is weak. It remains unclear why our tendency to
favour other humans should be a basis for moral value, whereas other similar tendencies (such as racism
or sexism) are not.
30. Regan, Tom, “The Case for Animal Rights”, in Carl Cohen & Tom Regan 2001, pp. 175-180; see
also Regan 1983.
31. Also others than those involved directly in animal ethics have presented similar arguments. Robert
Nozick, for one, has characterised the human-centred way of valuing animals as a claim for
“utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people” and thinks it is difficult to maintain that animals
ought to be valued only in terms of kind treatment, whereas humans are thought to possess actual
inherent value. Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State and Utopia. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), pp. 35-42.
32. Now, of course there are always some conditions to duties. Common conditions in animal ethics have
included the right to protect oneself against severe harm (hence, we may kill animals in a situation where
no other means of survival is possible), and the claim that in so-called ”life-boat” situation humans are to
be favoured instead of animals. See for instance Regan 1983. Especially the latter one of these conditions
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has been criticised, see for instance Finsen, Susan. “Sinking the Research Lifeboat”, The Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy. Vol. 13 1 (1988); Pluhar, Evelyn. Beyond Prejudice. The Moral Significance
of Human and Nonhuman Animals. (London: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 288-294). However,
despite the fact that there are some conditions, in general animal ethics (and especially the so-called ”first
generation” of it) has emphasised a rather strict notion of duties.
33. Regan 1983.
34. See Rollin, Bernard E. Animal Rights and Human Morality. (Revised edition.) (New York:
Prometheus Books, 1992); also, for instance, Auxter, Thomas. “The Right Not to be Eaten”. Inquiry.
Vol. 22, (1979).
35. It has to be noted that the line between the second and third generation is not always clear, as
heterogeneity may coincide with criticism of theory.
36. See for example Slicer, Deborah. “Your Daughter or Your Dog? A Feminist Assessment of the
Animal Research Issue”. Hypatia 6:1 (1991); Plumwood, Val. “Nature, Self, Gender: Feminism,
Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism”. Hypatia 6:1 (1991); Luke, Brian. “Taming
Ourselves or Going Feral? Toward Nonpatriarchal Metaethic of Animal Liberation”. In Carol J. Adams &
Josephine Donovan (eds.) Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations. (London: Duke
University Press, 1995.); Birke, Lynda. Feminism, Animals and Science: The Naming of the Shrew.
(Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1994), p. 137; Vance, Linda. ”Beyond Just-So Stories: Narrative,
Animals, and Ethics”, in Adams & Donovan 1995. A further point of criticism is based on the emphasis
on ”animal otherness”. The claim has been that animals need to be recognised as individual creatures,
whom we cannot ever comprehend ”directly”. Any ethics concerning them should avoid placing the
criterion of value on elements that emphasise similarities between humans and other animals, for to do so
would disrespect the animal otherness. For an analyses and criticism of this ”postmodern animal ethics”,
see Aaltola, Elisa. “Other Animal Ethics and the Demand for Difference”. Environmental Values 11
(2002).
37. See for example Caputo, John D. Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with
Constant Reference to Deconstruction. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). This type of
understanding rests on the ”classics” (Derrida, Levinas, etc.) of postmodern thought.
38. In fact, some argue that epistemology comes before ethics. See for instance Plumwood 1991; Norton,
Bryan. “Epistemology and Environmental Values”. The Monist, 75:2 (1992).
39. See again Plumwood 1991; Slicer 1991.
40. See, for instance, Nussbaum, Martha. Love’s Knowledge. (New York: Oxford University Press,
1990); Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995); Midgley,
Mary. Heart and Mind. (Sussex: Harvest Press, 1981); Midgley, Mary. The Ethical Primate. Humans,
freedom and morality. (London: Routledge, 1994); McShea Robert & McShea Daniel. “Biology and
Value Theory“ in Jane Maienschein and Michael Ruse (eds.) Biology and the Foundation of Ethics.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and more specifically in animal ethics, Solomon, Robert
C. “Peter Singer’s Expanding Circle: Compassion and the Liberation of Ethics” in Dale Jamieson (ed.):
Singer and His Critics. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). Of course, emotions have been emphasised also
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inside the ”traditional ethics”. For instance, McShea & McShea find basis for their emotion-based ethics
from David Hume and his conceptions of sympathy and ”parliament of emotion”; also for instance
Schopenhauer should be kept in mind.
41. Also, for example, John McDowell, Jonathan Dancy, and David McNaughton can be included.
Particularism has been connected to virtue-ethics. Nussbaum 1990; 1995; McDowell, John. “Virtue and
Reason”. In Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997). See also Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues.
(London: Duckworth, 1999). Also emphasis on biological tendencies rests to some extent on Aristotle’s
views, most notably in claiming that 1) morality is partly a natural inclination (here especially the notion
of “natural virtues” is of importance) and that 2) one of its main functions is to enable the formation and
keeping together of communities. See Lennox, James G. “Aristotle on the Biological Roots of Virtue:
The Natural History of Natural Virtue”. In Jane Maienschein and Michael Ruse (eds.), Biology and the
Foundation of Ethics. (Cambridge: CUP, 1999).
42. This is a sufficient, not a necessary criterion for value.
43. In the age of evolution theory the first ones to connect biology and morals were Jean-Baptiste
Lamarck and Charles Darwin themselves, and later Thomas Huxley and George Simpson, just to name a
few. See Sloan, Phillip R, “From Natural Law to Evolutionary Ethics in Enlightenment French Natural
History”; Richards, Robert J, “Darwin’s Romantic Biology: The Foundation of His Evolutionary Ethics”;
Ruse, Michael, “Evolutionary Ethics in the Twentieth Century: Julian Sorell Huxley and George Gaylord
Simpson”; all in Jane Maienschein and Michael Ruse (eds.), Biology and the Foundation of Ethics.
(Cambridge: CUP, 1999).
44. Midgley 1983, p. 60.
45. Midgley 1983, p. 91, 93. See also Sprigge, T. L. S. “Metaphysics, Physicalism, and Animal Rights”.
Inquiry. Vol. 22 (1979). It is has to be noted that of course such identification is never complete, and that
hence true “simulation” is always an ideal. On specific criticism of simulation, see Holton, Richard and
Langton, Rae. “Empathy and Animal Ethics”. In Dale Jamieson (ed.): Singer and His Critics. (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1999). Holton and Langton emphasise the difficulties of simulation, but make the mistake of
concluding from that identification is an insufficient element in animal ethics. The argument here is that
although an ideal, we may have sufficient knowledge (be it physical, personal or historical) of the animal
that makes identification a fruitful method. See Dawkins 1998; Flanagan, Owen. Consciousness
Reconsidered. (London: MIT Press, 1992).
46. Midgley, Mary, Animals and Why They Matter. Athens: University of Georgia Press 1983. Midgley
1994; Midgley, Mary. Evolution as Religion. (London : Routledge, 2002). Neill, Warren. “An
Emotocentric Theory of Interests”. Environmental Ethics 20:2 (1998). Rachels, James. Created From
Animal. The Moral Implications of Darwinism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
47. Norton, Bryan. “Caring for Nature: A Broader Look at Animal Stewardship”. In Bryan Norton et al
(eds.) Ethics of the Ark: Zoos, Animal Welfare, and Wildlife Conservation. (London: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1995). Also, for instance Robert Elliot emphasises the importance of localised ethical
knowledge in environmental ethics. See Elliot, Robert. ”Meta-ethics and environmental ethics.”
Metaphilosophy, 16:2 (1985).
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48. It also has to be noted that there are differences in the theoretical strength of those advocating
identification, and that hence not all points of the criticism presented here applies to everyone.
49. Goldie, Peter. The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000). Next to
empathy, he also talks of “in-his-shoes imagining”, by which he means a situation, where we mix our
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